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THE GOLD STANDARD, THE EURO, AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE GREEK SOVEREIGN
DERT GRISIS
Harris Delias and George S. Tavlas
The planners of a European monetary union would be well
advised to study the reasons the pre-World War I gold standard
was a successfnl monetary regime.
—Anna J. Schwartz (1993)
The entry of Greece into the eurozone in 2001 was widely
expected to mark a transformation in the country's economic destiny.
During the decade of the 1980s, and for much of the 1990s, the econ-
omy had been saddled with double-digit inflation rates, double-digit
fiscal deficits (as a percentage of GDP), large current-account imbal-
ances, very low growfli rates, and a series of exchange rate crises.
Adoption of the euro—the value of which was underpinned by the
monetary policy of the European Gentral Bank (EGB)—^was
expected to produce a low-inflation environment, contributing to
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lower nominal interest rates and longer economic horizons, thereby
encouraging private investment and economic growth. The elimina-
tion of nominal exchange-rate fluctuations among the former curren-
cies of members of the eurozone was expected to reduce exchange
rate uncertainty and risk premia, lowering the costs of servicing the
public sector debt, facilitating fiscal adjustment, and freeing
resources for other uses.
And that is precisely what happened—at least for a while. In the
years immediately prior to and immediately after Creece's entry into
the eurozone, nominal and real interest rates came down sharply,
contributing to high real growth rates. From 2001 through 2008, real
GDP rose by an average rate of 3.9 percent per year— t^he second-
highest growtli rate (after diat of Ireland) in the eurozone. Inflation,
which averaged almost 10 percent in the decade prior to eurozone
entry, averaged only 3.4 percent over the period 2001-08. Then,
beginning in 2009, everything changed as Creece became the center
of a major financial crisis. Interest rates on long-tenn govemment
debt soared from the low single digits prior to the crisis to a peak of
42 percent in early 2012; the country had to resort to two successive
adjustment programs (in May 2010 and March 2012) with official
international lenders; and the Creek govemment restructured its
debt. Between the end of 2008 and mid-2012, the economy con-
tracted by a cumulative 20 percent (and it continues to contract), and
the unemployment rate jumped from less than 8 percent to about
25 percent. Like Odysseus's retum trip home from the Trojan War,
the road to Ithaca led to a Tartarean hell.
What happened? And why did it happen? To answer these ques-
tions, we begin by describing the origins of the Creek financial crisis,
highlighting the cmcial role of growing fiscal and external imbal-
ances. Next, we identify what we believe was a key factor that abet-
ted those imbalances—namely, the absence of an automatic
eurozone adjustment mechanism to reduce members' external
imbalances. To illustrate our argument, we compare the adjustment
mechanism in the eurozone with the adjustment mechanism for the
participants of the classical gold-standard regime of the late 19th and
early 20th centuries. Are tliere major differences between the work-
ing of tlie gold-standard adjustment mechanism and tliat of the euro-
zone? What are the lessons that can be drawn from a comparison
between the gold standard and the eurozone? We address these
questions in what follows.
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FIGURE 1
GREEK SPREADS: YIELDS ON GREEK OVER GERMAN
10-YEAR BENCHMARK BONDS
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The Years of Living Dangerously
As mentioned, Greek interest rates came down sharply in the
years immediately prior to, and immediately after, the country's
entry into the enrozone. Figure 1 shows the monthly interest-rate
spread between 10-year Greek and German govemment bonds for
the period 1998-2012.' The spread fell steadüy, from over 600
basis points in early 1998 to about 100 basis points one year prior
to Greece's eurozone entry. By the time Greece entered the euro-
zone in 2001, the spread had fallen to around 50 basis points;
'In 1994, the Greek govemment set a goal to enter the eurozone on January 1,2001.
The convergence of Greek economic indicators to those of other European Union
countries contributed after 1994 to the narrowing of interest-rate spreads prior to
eurozone entry. Eor an analysis of tlie Greek economy before eurozone entry, see
Garganas and Tavlas (2001).
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it continued to narrow subsequently, declining to between 10 and
30 basis points from late 2002 until the end of 2007. During the
latter period, the absolute levels of nominal interest rates on the
10-year Greek instrument fluctuated in a range of 3.5-4.5 percent,
compared with a range of 5.0-6.5 percent in the year prior to euro-
zone entry.
Although entry to the eurozone contributed to a period of low
interest rates and rapid real growth, deep-seated problems in the
Greek economy remained unaddressed, reflecting a procyclical
fiscal policy; as a result, the country continued to run large fiscal
and external deficits. Figures 2 and 3 show data on fiscal deficits
and government debt as a percentage of GDP. Several features
stand out with regard to the period 2001-09. First, fiscal deficits
consistently exceeded the Stability and Growth Pact's limit of
3 percent of GDP during the entire period, rising to 9.8 percent of
GDP in 2008 and 15.6 percent of GDP in 2009.^ Second, the
widening of the deficits was mainly expenditure-driven; between
2005 and 2009 the share of govemment spending in GDP rose by
9 percentage points (to 54 percent), with the bulk of the rise
occurring between 2006 and 2009, a period that featured a
govemment run by a conservative party. Third, beginning in 2007,
the deficits underpinned an unsustainable increase in the govern-
ment debt-to-GDP ratio, culminating in the crisis that erupted in
late 2009.
The large and widening fiscal deficits contributed to growing cur-
rent account deficits. There are two main series on the Greek cur-
rent account. One is compiled by the Bank of Greece, based on
information on intemational transactions reported by commercial
European Union's Stability and Growth Pact requires that members' fiscal
deficits be below 3 percent of GDP and their debt-to-GDP ratios below 60 per-
cent of GDP. Entry into the eurozone is, in part, contingent on the satisfaction of
these fiscal criteria. In the case of the debt-to-GDP criterion, countries can be
allowed to join if the debt ratio is seen to be approaching the 60 percent critical
value at a satisfactory pace. The latter circumstance applied to Greece. In the
year 2000, Greece was allowed entry into the eurozone with a debt-to-GDP ratio
near 100 percent of GDP (because the ratio was on a declining path) and a fiscal
deficit initially reported at 3.0 percent of GDP; the latter figure was subsequently
revised to 4.5 percent of GDP after Greece became a member of Europe's
monetary union.
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FIGURE 2
GREECE: EVOLUTION OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT
DEFICIT, PRIMARY DEFICIT, AND DEBT
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FIGURE 3
GREECE: TOTAL REVENUE, EXPENDITURE, AND DEFICIT
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FIGURE 4
GREEK CURRENT AGGOUNT
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Annual Macroeconomic Datahase,
banks. The other, used in the national accounts and by the
European Union, is derived from customs infonnation.^ Both series
are plotted in Figure 4. Both show that the deficit was large (in rela-
tion to GDP) upon Greece's entry in the eurozone, and grew even
larger in the following years. The Bank of Greece data show that the
current account deficit rose from about 7 percent of GDP in 2001
to almost 15 percent in 2008, before declining to about 14 percent
in 2009. The national account series shows the current account
deficit rising from 11.5 percent of GDP in 2001 to almost 18 percent
in 2008, before declining to about 15 percent in 2009.
Figure 5 compares die current account positions of Greece,
Germany (the center country of the eurozone), and the eurozone as
a whole, based on national accounts data to ensure consistency. The
reason that we compare Greece widi Germany will become clear
later when we discuss tlie adjustment mechanism in the eurozone.
Two points are important to mention. First, during the period
^Differences between tlie two are roughly attributed to different compilation
methods and data sources that are difficult to cross-check.
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FICURE 5
CURRENT AGCOUNTS
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2001-09 the current account of the eurozone as a whole was roughly
in balance. Second, the current account of Cermany went from
essentially a balanced position in 2001 to a surplus of around
6 percent of CDP in 2008, a swing of some 6 percentage points,
almost tlie same percentage as the increase in Creece's current
account deficit during the same period.^
Figures 6 and 7 show the relative contributions of tlie public and
private sectors, respectively, to the evolution of the current account
balances of Creece, Cermany, and the eurozone as a whole. Again,
several points stand out. In the case of Creece, the widening of the
current account deficit was caused entirely by the behavior of the
public sector;^ net public saving (relative to CDP) fell from around
minus four percent in 2001, to minus 15 percent of CDP in 2009.
During the same period, net private saving (relative to CDP) in
''Nonetheless, the nominal magnitudes were very different. In 2008, Germany's
current account surplus totaled €154.1 billion; Greece's current account deficit
was €!41.7 billion.
circumstance differs from those of Ireland, Portugal and Spain, where the
private sector was mainly responsible for the widening of the current account
positions of those countries. See Holinski, Kool, and Muysken (2012).
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FIGURE 7
NET PRIVATE SAVING
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Greece rose, from about minus 7 percent to around minus 1 percent
of GDP. For Gennany and the eurozone as a whole net public sav-
ing increased from 2001 flirough 2007, before declining in 2008; net
private saving rose in both Germany and the eurozone as a whole.
Eruption
The global financial crisis that empted in August 2007, following
flie collapse of die U.S. subprime mortgage market, initially had
litile impact on Greek financial markets. Spreads on the 10-year
instnunent, which were in a range of 20-30 basis points during
January-July of 2007, remained in flie vicinity of 30 basis points for
the remainder of 2007 and the first few monflis of 2008 (Figure 1).
With the collapse (and sale) of Bear Steams in March 2008, spreads
widened to about 60 basis points, where they remained until the col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008. The latter event
brought spreads up to around 250 basis points during die first few
months of 2009, but they gradually came back down to about
120 basis points in August and September of 2009.
Then came a double shock in the autumn of 2009. Two devel-
opments combined to disrupt the relative tranquility of Greek
financial markets. First, in October the newly elected Greek gov-
ernment announced that the 2009 fiscal deficit would be 12.7 per-
cent of GDP, more than double the previous government's
projection of 6.0 percent. In tum, the 12.7 percent figure would
undergo further upward revisions, so that the outcome was a
deficit of 15.6 percent of GDP. Second, in November 2009
DubaiWorld, the conglomerate owned by the govemment of the
Gulf emirate, asked creditors for a six-month debt moratorium.
That news rattled financial markets around the world and led to a
sharp increase in risk aversion. In light of the rapid worsening of
the fiscal situation in Greece, financial markets and rating agencies
turned their attention to the sustainability of Greece's fiscal and
external imbalances. The previously held notion that membership
of the eurozone would provide an impenetrable barrier against risk
was destroyed. It became clear that, while such membership
provides protection against exchange-rate risk, it cannot provide
protection against credit risk.
The two shocks set off a sharp and prolonged rise in spreads,
which continued into early 2012. As shown in Figure 1, the spread on
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the 10-year sovereign widened from about 130 basis points in
October 2009, to around 900 basis points one year later." The widen-
ing took place despite a May 2010 agreement between the Greek
govemment and tlie Intemational Monetary Fund, the European
Gentral Bank, and the European Commission for a 3-year €110 bil-
Uon adjustment program. By early 2012, the Greek-Gennan spread
had widened to about 4,000 basis points and it became clear diat
Greece's rising debt burden was no longer sustainable. In March
2012, the Greek govemment agreed to a new €130 bilUon adjust-
ment program widi the official lenders, and die countiy restructured
its sovereign debt.
To summarize the above discussion, Greece entered the euro-
zone with a current account deficit of about 10 percent of GDP
(depending on the current account series used); the current
account deficit widened sharply in the following years, leading to
the crisis that erupted in late 2009. The major factor underpinning
Greece's large and growing current-account deficits was the
decUne in net pubUc saving. Germany, in contrast, went from a
current account deficit of about 1 percent of GDP in the early
2000s to a surplus of about 6 percent by the time of the outbreak
of the Greek crisis. As we will see, changes in the relative compet-
itive positions of Greece and Germany help explain the move-
ments of the external positions of the two countries. A question
that arises is how a country like Greece, which entered Europe's
monetary nnion with an external deficit of about 10 percent of
GDP, was able to function for many years without adjusting its
external position. To address that question, we tum to a compari-
son of the adjustment mechanisms under the classical gold stan-
dard and the euro.
The Gold Standard and the Euro
A prominent feature of recent discussions about the eurozone
has been a comparison of the functioning of that area's fixed
^Gibson, Hall, and Tavlas (2012) estímate a cointegratíng relationship between
Greek spreads and their long-tenii fundamental determinants and compare the
spreads predicted by this estimated relationship with actual spreads. The authors
find that spreads were significantly below what would be predicted by fundamen-
tals from the end of 2004 up to the middle of 2005; by contrast, in 2010, spreads
exceeded predicted spreads by some 400 basis points.
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exchange rate regime with that of the gold standard of the late-
19th and earIy-20th centuries (see Buttonwood 2010, Eichengreen
and Temin 2010, Boone and Johnson 2012, James 2012). In this
connection, James (2012: 1) stated: "The European Monetary
Union, as many of its critics maintain, looks a lot like the pre-1913
gold standard, which imposed fixed exchange rates on extremely
diverse economies." How relevant is the gold standard metaphor?''
In this section, we briefly describe key characteristics of the gold
standard of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and compare
adjustment to external imbalances between the two regimes dur-
ing noncrises periods. The latter comparison, in particular, will
help shed hght on the underlying origins of the present crisis in the
eurozone.
What Was the Classical Gold Standard?
Essentially, the gold standard was a regime under which the
exchange rates of the participating countries moved within narrow
limits approximating their respective gold points without the sup-
port of exchange restrictions, import quotas, or related controls."
The authorities of the participating countries maintained these
fixed prices by being willing to buy or sell gold on demand at that
fixed price. The classical gold standard, under which the circula-
tion of domestic currencies was tied (to varying degrees) to gold,
and international settlements were made primarily in gold (and, to
a lesser extent, in pound sterling), prevailed in its most pure form
The recent literature focuses on similarities between the gold standard and euro-
zone regimes. For example, Eichengreen and Temin (2010) pointed out that both
regimes lack an escape mechanism to facilitate adjustment, with the escape
mechanism being more binding for the euro regime than it was for the gold stan-
dard since, under the gold standard, countries retained their national currencies
so that they could modify tlie regime. In our discussion, we focus on a major
difference between the two regimes. For recent analyses of the performances of
alternate exchange-rate regimes, see Tavlas, Delias, and Stockman (2008) and
Delias and Tavlas (2013),
•^ The gold points were the points at which it became profitable to either export or
import gold because of deviations between tlie market and mint prices of gold
(Eichengreen 1996: 196), Effectively, the gold points functioned as the edges of
exchange rate bands under which the exchange rate could fluctuate without occa-
sioning either corrective gold flows or central bank intervention (Eichengreen
1994: 42),
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during the period from 1880 to 1913 (see Bloomfield 1959: 9,
Bordo 1981: 2, Eichengreen 1996: 42).«
Bordo (1981, 1993) compared tlie performance of the classical
gold standard with its successor regimes, including the gold exchange
standard that operated from tlie mid-1920s until the mid-1930s, the
Bretton Woods regime that operated from the mid-1940s until the
early 1970s, and the managed float that began in tlie earlyl970s.
Overall, Bordo (1993:182) found diat the classical gold standard per-
formed less well relative to otlier regimes in terms of the stability of
real variables but achieved tlie lowest rate of inflation and the high-
est degrees of inflation and interest-rate convergence, raising the fol-
lowing question: "Why was . . . tlie classical gold standard so unstable
[in tenns of real variables] yet so durable?"
Three (interrelated) characteristics of die classical gold standard
appear to have contributed to its durability. First, it "facilitated
adjustments to balance of payments disequilibrium" (Bloomfield
1959: 22; see, also, Eichengreen 1992: 29-66). Second, it operated
with "virtually no instances of major or sustained 'runs' on any of
[tlie] currencies [of the leading participating countries]" (Bloomfield
1959: 21); indeed, devaluations of currencies on the gold standard
"were liighly exceptional" (Bloomfield 1959: 2). Tliird, it provided
"an effective defense against [inflationary policies] of a ldnd that time
and again [had previously] led to tlie debasement and depreciation of
once-proud currencies" (Friedman 1953: 179).
What countries were members of the classical gold standard
club?'" Historians distinguish between core members of tlie club and
peripheral members. Core countries included France, Cennany, and
the United Kingdom, with Belgium and the Netherlands also some-
times considered part of tlie core category. Among tlie common fea-
tures of these countries are that each had relatively well-developed
financial markets and a central bank. The periphery included
Canada, South Africa, tlie United States, and parts of Latin America
^As Scammell (1965: 32) put it, "The nineteenth century gold standard was a gold
coinage standard, in which gold coins circulated domestically and were inter-
changeable with notes at the central bank." Although fiat (paper) money was
increasingly used during the classical gold standard to economize on the scarce
resources tied up with commodity money, fiat money became acceptable only
because it was convertible into gold (Bordo and Kydland 1996: 63).
'"As Bloomfield (1959; 14) observed, "The composition of tlie gold standard 'club'
changed over the course of the [1880-1914] period."
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(Argentina, Brazil, Mexico), Asia (including Australia, New Zealand),
and Europe (Austria-Hungary, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Russia,
Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries)." Their economies
were typicaUy financiaUy less developed than those ofthe core coun-
tries and most of tliem clid not have a central bank during at least pait
ofthe gold standard period.
Some of tlie peripheral countries participated in the gold standard
only during part of tlie 1880-1913 period. Additionally, some coun-
tries that were not formaUy on the gold standard nevertheless fol-
lowed policies that were consistent with a fixed price of tlieir
currencies against gold in an effort to "shadow" the gold standard.
With regard to countries that are sometimes considered to have been
members of the European periphery, the foUowing particular cir-
cumstances merit comment.
• Greece joined the gold standard in January 1885 but dropped
out in September of 1885, because, as Lazaretou (2004: 14)
noted, the govemment failed to control the fiscal deficits and
tlins to support the credibility ofthe system. It rejoined the gold
standard in 1910. Given the very limited duration of its partici-
pation Ü1 the gold standard, and the inconsistency of its policies
with such participation, in what foUows we do not consider
Greece to have been a member of the periphery.
• Italy joined die gold standard in March 1883 but dropped out
in Febmary 1894 (Fratianni and SpineUi 1984). FoUowing a
period of floating exchange rates from 1894 until 1902, the mon-
etary authorities shadowed the gold standard. As Bordo and
Kydland (1996: 78) argue, "The monetary authorities acted as if
tliey were on the gold standard. . . . Money growth was low and
the budget was often in snrplus." Thus, Italy's economic indica-
tors were in Une with those of fuU-time periphery members.'^
"There is not a clear consensus among historians as to which countries comprised
the periphery. For example, Eichengreen (1996; 39) included the United States
while Officer (2010) did not. Since the Federal Reserve System was not estab-
lished until December 1913, most historians consider that the United States was
part of the gold standard periphery. This circumstance also applies to
Switzerland, since the Swiss National Bank was not established until 1907.
Austria-Hungary and Russia are sometimes considered to be core countries, but
they did not join the gold standard until the mid-1890s.
'^Cesarano, Gifarelli, and Toniolo (2012: 253) argued that the policy of "shadow-
ing the gold standard proved very successful."
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• Portugal was a member of the gold standard from 1854 until
1891; its departure from tlie gold standard in 1891 was, in part,
related to domestic political instability, following a failed
attempt to establish a Republic (Duarte and Andrade 2004).
After its departure from the gold standard, Portiigal shadowed
the gold standard, without committing to it (Soto 1999: 468).
• Spain was a member of the gold standard from 1874 until 1883;
it suspended gold convertibility in 1883, in the aftermath of a
sovereign crisis (Martin-Acena 1994: 136-37). Spain then
pegged its currency to the pound sterling in an attempt to
shadow the gold standard (see Soto 1999: 468).'"
The Adjustment Mechanism
The gold standard proved to be a remarkably durable regime, with
periods of tranquility far outlasting crisis periods, while the tranquil-
ity of die eurozone has proved to be short-lived. What accounted for
the gold standard's tranquility? In answering this question, we must
distinguish between the operation of the gold standard at its core and
at its periphery.
The Core—For its core participants, the gold standard pos-
sessed an adjustment mechanism that served to reduce external
imbalances (Scammell 1965, Eichengreen 1996). Consider first
the operation of the gold standard in the absence of capital flows.
To simplify the discussion, let us assume a two-country world com-
prised of Creece and Cermany, in which Creece runs a trade
deficit and Cermany runs a trade surplus. Let us also assume that
only gold coins circulate and prices and wages are flexible in both
countries. In such a situation, the gold standard adjustment
process—called the price-specie-flow mechanism—^worked as
follows:
• Creece experiences a gold outflow, decreasing the money sup-
ply and reducing credit growth (perhaps reducing the quantity
of credit) in that country, causing prices and wages to fall.
• Cermany experiences a gold inflow, increasing the money sup-
ply and raising credit growth in diat country, causing prices and
wages to rise.
'^According to Soto (1999: 469), "There was a credible attempt to adhere to the
[gold standard] system, but only the decision of shadowing was taken."
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• As a result ofthe change in relative prices, Greece's exports rise
and its imports faU, eliminating its trade deficit. The opposite
occurs in Germany.
Gapital flows reinforced the overall self-equilibrating character of
the system as it operated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Typically, the central bank of a country experiencing a trade deficit
would increase its discount rate, reducing its holdings of domestic
interest-bearing assets and drawing cash from the market
(Eichengreen 1996: 28). This action produced two main effects.
First, the money supply and credit growth in tlie country raising
rates declined, reducing (or eUminating) the need of gold ontflows
from that country. In fact, capital could flow into the country as a
result ofthe rise in the discount rate, smoothing the required adjust-
ment. Second, the rise in interest rates would reduce economic
activity in the country concemed, decreasing prices and, thereby,
contributing to the eUmination of the country's external imbalance,
through both relative-price adjustment and the decrease in aggre-
gate demand.
The pre-World War I gold standard operated in the above man-
ner among the core countries (ScammeU 1965: 35). These countries
possessed the institutional capacity to make their commitment to the
gold standard credible. Thus, they were able to issue debt denomi-
nated in their own currencies, each of which represented a certain
amount of gold.
What did this institutional capacity comprise? Effectively, it
included tlie foUowing elements. First, the requirements of fixed
exchange rates and free convertibiUty dominated tlie requirement of
domestic economic stability—that is, extemal balance took prece-
dence over intemal balance (Friedman 1953: 166-67). Because there
was no weU-aiticulated theory connecting changes in monetary policy
with domestic economic conditions, there was little or no pressure on
central banks to adjust interest rates in response to changes in those
conditions (Eichengreen 1992: 30). Gonsequendy, economic agents
were assured that the authorities would take any necessary actions to
restore extemal equilibrium without the need to adjust the nominal
exchange rate or to restrict convertibility. Second, the monetary
authorities operated within an environment in which "the pnbUc sec-
tor was in general only a smaU one, where fiscal policy and debt man-
agement policy in tlieir modem sense were virtually unknown, and
where govemment budgets were for the most part in balance"
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(Bloomfield 1959: 20).'^  Third, should the budget fall into a deficit
there was no question of the autliorities' commitment to restore bal-
anced budgets, if need be, by raising tax rates. This commitment was
rendered credible by their institutional capacity to raise taxes— t^hat is,
the core countries possessed strong legal frameworks, well-developed
public administrations, and eflicient bureaucracies. As a result of tlieir
credible commitment to sound finance, tlie core economies could mn
small budget deficits, if needed, to respond to extraordinary shocks
without raising concems about their ability to service their debts.
Because there was no question about the authorities' commitment
to (1) do whatever it takes to maintain tlie price of gold and convert-
ibility, and (2) balance the budget, for a core country facing an incip-
ient crisis, "capital flowed in quickly and in significant quantities,"
mitigating the crisis (Eichengreen 1996: 31; see, also, Friedman
1953: 186). Since production by govemments was mainly composed
of nontraded goods and services, the small size of the public sector
typically meant that tlie nontraded goods sector was a relatively small
one. Consequently, a given size of an internal devaluation would have
a relatively large impact on traded goods, increasing exports, reduc-
ing imports, and facilitating external adjustment.'^
The Periphery—In contrast, the situation among tlie economies in
the periphery varied. These economies were financially less devel-
oped and, therefore, needed access to intemational financial markets
in order to finance both private and public investments. At tlie same
time, tlieir fiscal policy institutions lacked credibility and intema-
tional investors were reluctant to lend to them at low interest rates
without gold or foreign exchange clauses in loan contracts
(Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999). Thus, for the capital-scarce
peripheral economies, participation in a system of hard pegs, such as
the gold standard, addressed tlie problem of dynamic inconsistency
in monetary policy and acted as a "good housekeeping seal of
approval," providing diem access to intemational capital markets at
lower interest rates than would otherwise have been the case (Bordo
and Rockoff 1996, Obstfeld and Taylor 2003). However, extemal
"Goodhart (1992; 192) made a similar argument; "Governments generally abided
by a balanced budget objective, which could be managed, in effect, as represent-
ing the required fiscal constraint on national policies."
' ^ h e high degree of discipline imposed by the gold standard would make it dif-
ficult to implement today. As Bordo (1992; 270) put it, "[In present circum-
stances] few countiies [would be] willing to accept tlie gold standard's discipline."
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shocks (mainly to commodity prices) and (especially) domestic fiscal
shocks sometimes triggered a sudden stop to capital inflows to those
countries, leading to currency and sometimes debt crises.
The frequency of extemal debt defaults was much higher for the
Latin American peripheral participants, which had a procUvity for
foUowing expansionary fiscal poUcies, dian it was for the European
peripheral members, which typically ran relatively small fiscal
deficits."* In this connection. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011: 91)
reporied tliree cases of extemal debt default among European
peripheral countries during the period 1880 to 1913: Spain in 1882,
Russia in 1885, and Poriugal in 1890.'' Reinhart and Rogoff also
reporied 19 cases of default among the Latin American periphery
during the same period.
Table 1 reports data on fiscal balances, govemment spending, and
current account balances as percentages of GDP for four European
core countries (France, Gennany, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom) and three European peripheral countiies fliat participated
in the gold standard for most of" the period 1880 to 1913 (Denmark,
Norway, and Sweden) along wifli occasional gold standard partici-
pants (Italy, Spain, and Greece)."* The data are averages over the
period 1880 to 1913.
Several features of Table 1 are imporiant to mention. First, the fis-
cal balances were in most cases essentiaUy in balance. Second, in
most cases flie share of govemment spending was 10 percent or less
of GDP. Third, the core countries ran current account surpluses (on
average), while the peripheral countries typicaUy ran current account
deficits (on average). However, the cuirent account deficits of the
peripheral countries typically were smaU; for each of the peripheral
countries reporied in the table, flie current account deficit averaged
below 3 percent of GDP.'" Foiuth, the major exception is the case of
'"Eichengreen (1994: 44) described the experiences of the Latin American
periphery as follows: "Latín American countries repeatedly failed to control tlieir
fiscal policies, leading to a monetarizatíon of budget deficits, the suspension of
gold convertibility, and currency depreciatíon."
'"Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) reported that Greece defaulted on its debt in 1893.
As noted, Greece was not on the gold standard in 1893.
'*rhe choice of countries was based on the availability of data for those countries
during the period in questíon.
"^Although, Table 1 reports average values for the period 1880 to 1913, each of the
three series in Table 1 shows low volatility for each comitry reported in the table.
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Greece, which, in an effori to build its infrastmcture foUowing cen-
turies of occupation, consistendy ran large fiscal and extemal deficits.
It is no coincidence, therefore, fliat Greece, in contrast to the mem-
bers of the gold standard clnb, suffered a series of sovereign debt and
currency crises under the gold standard.
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 show (long-term) interest-rate spreads against
the United Kingdom for three fuU-time peripheral countries—
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden—along wifli Greece, Italy, and
Spain during tlie period 1880-1913. Again, several points are impor-
tant to highUght. TypicaUy, spreads imder the gold standai'd were
fairly large—in flie range of 100 to 400 basis points—despite the
smaU extemal and fiscal imbalances of flie participating countries.
The case of Greece is the exception fliat proves the mle. It was not a
member of the gold standard for most of the gold standard period,
and its spreads were far above those of other European countries
dxiring the gold standard years. It also had by far flie largest imbal-
ances and the largest govemment sector.
The upshot of flie data on spreads is that investors drew a distinc-
tion between the sovereign risk of the core country—flie United
Kingdom—and the sovereign risk attached to the debt of the
FIGURE 8.1
LONG-TERM INTEREST RATE SPREADS VS. THE UK:
SWEDEN, NORWAY, AND DENMARK
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SOURCE: Schularick and Taylor (2009).
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FIGURE 8.2
LONG-TERM INTEREST RATE SPREADS VS. THE UK:
GREEGE, SPAIN, AND ITALY
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SoxmcE: Schularick and Taylor (2009),
periphery. The latter debt carried a risk premium, despite the mosfly
sound fiscal and current account fundamentals of the countries con-
cemed. The knowledge that sovereign credit risk—and, therefore,
spreads—^would rise if imbalances rose limited flie size and persist-
ence of flie imbalances. In tum, these small imbalances underpinned
flie durability of flie system.
To summarize, a key feature of flie classical gold standai^ d was the
distinction between the operation of the system in the core countries
and its operation in the periphery.
• In flie core countries, govemment budgets were, for the most
part, in balance. The adjustment mechanism operated through
the price-specie-flow mechanism to restore extemal equilibria.
Tliis mechanism was reinforced, if need be, by flie counter-
cyclical policies of national central banks. As a result of flie
authorities' commitment to maintain balanced budgets and to
restore extemal equilibria, flie regime proved to be durable,
wifli virtually no sustained runs on any of flie core currencies.
• In the European periphery, attacks on currencies and sovereign
defaults among the countries of the European peripheiy were
rather infrequent events, reflecting the small extemal
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imbalances of diese countries, the size and persistence of which
was limited by three factors. First, fiscal shocks were relatively
small in comparison to such shocks today because of the small
size of govemments. Second, the adjustment mechanism for
the core countries was also more or less operational for the
European peripheral countries, limiting the size and persist-
ence of extemal deficits. Third, as reflected in the spreads on
interest rates, there was no expectation that the core conntries
would step in to provide debt relief to a heavily indebted
peripheral country. Therefore, the debt of die European
periphery was considered to contain sovereign risk, limiting die
demand for such debt by foreign investors. Consequently,
European peripheral countries found it difficult to finance large
current account imbalances on a sustained basis.
• The experiences of Greece, which, as noted, was not a member
of the gold standard club for most of the gold standard period,
and the Latin American peripheral countries differed from
tliose of the full-time European members of the club. In partic-
ular, Greece and die Latin American peripheral countries expe-
rienced frequent sovereign defaults and currency crises,
typically triggered by domestic fiscal shocks.
A key implication of the experiences of the participants in the
gold standard is the following: Adlierence to a hard peg is no
panacea and cannot be sustained without the support oí credible fis-
cal institutions.-"
The Euro Standard
As mentioned, the effective functioning of the gold standard
required a liigh degree of wage-price fiexibiUty so that adjustment to
extemal imbalances could take place. To bring about the necessary
changes in wages and prices, money and credit flowed from countries
experiencing extemal deficits to countries running extemal
surpluses.
Ever since the work of Robert Mundell (1961) on the conditions
needed to form monetary unions, die economic literature has placed
a liigh priority on the necessity of wage and price flexibility to facili-
tate adjustment to extemal imbalance in the absence of separate
experience of the gold standard provides clear-cut evidence for the
rationale of the EU's Stabihty and Growth Pact.
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TABLE 2
MONEY ( M 3 ) AND CREDIT G R O W T H
(ANNUAL AVERAGES, 2001-2009)
M3
Total Credit
Credit to Public Sector
Credit to Private Sector
Current Account Balance
(%ofGDP)
Creece
8.8
10.0
0.3
16.7
-13.4
Cermany
5.7
1.9
-1 .8
2.7
4.4
Euro Area
7.9
6.6
1.9
7.9
0.3
SOURCES: E C B Statistical Data Warehouse and European Commission
Annual Macroeconomic database.
currencies and the capacity to adjust the nominal exchange
However, as our discussion of tlie gold standard has indicated, wage
and price flexibiUty is a necessary but not a snfficient condition for
the operation of a fixed exchange rate regime. What is crucial is the
existence of an adjustment mechanism that triggers the necessary
changes in wages and prices.
The case of Greece under both the gold standard and the euro
iUustrates the importance of the adjustment mechanism. As noted,
Greece tried to participate in the gold standard but was unsuccess-
ful because it could not abide by its fiscal reqnirements.
Gonsequently, it was not able to benefit from the gold standard
adjustment mechanism, which would have contained the extemal
deficits. In contrast, under the euro, Greece was able, upon entry, to
borrow at near-core interest rates and at the same time, in the
absence of an adjustment mechanism, remain a member withont
underiaMng fiscal adjustment.
Indeed, the case of Greece between 2001 and 2009, the year in
which the Greek crisis erupted, iUustrates the absence of an adjust-
ment mechanism. Table 2 presents the average growth rates of M3,
total domestic credit, credit to the private sector, and credit to the
public sector for Greece, Germany, and the eurozone between 2001
^'Delias and Tavlas (2009) critically assess the development of the literature on
optimum currency areas.
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and 2009. As shown in the table, M3 growth and credit growth were
considerably higher in Creece, a country witli an extemal deficit dur-
ing the period in question, tlian diey were in Cermany, a country
with an extemal surplus, or the eurozone as a whole, wliich had,
essentially, balanced extemal accounts during that time. What is par-
ticularly striking is the much faster credit growth to the private sec-
tor (16.7 percent) in Creece than in Cennany (2.7 percent). In other
words, money and credit flowed in the opposite direction of that
needed to bring about extemal adjustment.
A consequence of these flows is shown in Figure 9, which presents
real (effective) exchange rates for Creece and Cermany during
2001-09; since Creece and Cennany share the same currency,
changes in the real exchange rate mainly reflect changes in the rela-
tive domestic (consumer) prices. As shown in the figure, Creece's
real exchange rate appreciated by about 15 percent against that of
Cermany, the opposite of what we would expect on the basis of die
countries' extemal positions, but entirely consistent with the relative
flows of money and credit in tlie two countries.
What caused money and credit to rise at high rates in Creece
between 2001 and 2009? The data on Creek govemment debt and
credit growth in Table 3 provide answers to that question. Several
FICURE 9
REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES
115-1
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- - Germany vs. Eurozone — Greece vs. Eurozone
SOURCE: European Commission Annual Macroeconomic Database.
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points are especially noteworthy. First, while the stock of govemment
debt rose by €147.8 billion from 2001 flirough 2009, domestic hold-
ings of that debt declined by €22,1 billion. Foreign holdings of Greek
govemment debt rose by €169.9 billion, accounting for more than
the overall increase in debt. Gonsequenfly, the share of Greek sover-
eign debt held by Greek residents fell from 56.6 percent to
21.3 percent while the share held by nonresidents rose from 43.4 per-
cent to 78.7 percent. Second, Greek banks were large net sellers of
Greek govemment debt. At the time of Greece's entry in the eurozone
in 2001, Greek banks held very large portfolios of Greek govemment
bonds, a result of flie requirements of the country's highly regulated
financial system of flie 1980s and 1990s rather than the banks' free
choice of poitfoHo composition. Tliis fact is demonstrated by the wind-
ing-down of the banks' holdings of Greek govemment paper following
flie liberalization of the financial sector that was completed in flie mid-
1990s. They used the proceeds received from the sale of the Greek
sovereigns, in part, to lend to the private sector. Gonsequenfly, credit
to flie private sector surged, especially from 2001 until 2008; credit
growth to the private sector accounted for flie bulk of the large expan-
sion of total credit during 2001 to 2009 (Table 2).
What underpinned the foregoing phenomenon was flie percep-
tion by intemational investors that Greek sovereign debt carried lit-
fle risk of default. The decrease in spreads on these financial
instmments to about 30 basis points in the mid-2000s (Figure 1) sug-
gests fliat markets indeed held such a perception. These perceptions,
however, seem to have been unreasonable in the face of historical
evidence linking the probability of default to the size of public debt
relative to GDP. For instance, during the 1980s Latin American
countries typically defaulted at public debt-to-GDP ratios that were
a fraction of fliat of Greece. Moreover, Greece's public debt-to-GDP
ratio was not only very large but was increasing during a period of
above-average economic growth, a worrying pattem. The only way
flie low risk premia can be justified is by assuming that investors
expected that the core of the eurozone would have no choice but to
bail out Greece in the event of a financial/fiscal crisis. The expecta-
tion of a bailout lowered the default risk and provided an incentive to
issue increasing amounts of debt.
It is this circumstance that differentiates the euro regime from flie
gold standard and allowed Greece to build up large extemal imbal-
ances. In contrast to the euro regime, under the gold standard there
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was no expectation that the core members would bail out the periph-
eral members. European members of the gold standard periphery,
by and large, maintained low fiscal deficits and current accounts that
were close to balance. If the fiscal policies of the peripheral countries
were not consistent with balanced extemal accounts, domestic inter-
est rates would rise and money and credit growth would slow, facili-
tating extemal adjustment. In tum, die small fiscal and extemal
imbalances under the gold standard underpinned its durability.
Countries such as Greece, the fiscal institutions of which could not
confonn to the system's fiscal requirements, were forced off the gold
standai'd. The price they paid for fiscal profligacy was much higher
interest rates than the peripheral participants of the gold standard.
The above process did not operate in the eurozone because
investors did not draw a distinction between the sovereign debt of
tlie core countries and the sovereign debt of the peripheral countries,
such as Greece. Consequently, there was no mechanism to adjust
money and credit growth, and Greece was able to mn large current
account and fiscal deficits without taking remedial policy measures.
This behavior resembled diat of the Latin American countries and of
European countries (such as Greece) that were not members of the
gold standard.
Conclusion
The experiences of the core and periphery countires under the
classical gold standard are relevant for the eurozone. The behavior of
the core participants has been quite similar across tlie two monetary
arrangements (i.e., small budget deficits, or even surpluses, and sus-
tainable current-account balances). Under the gold standard,
European peripheral countries ran current account deficits, but the
size of those deficits was small relative to those experienced by
Greece under the euro. They were small because fiscal shocks were
smaller and, more importantly, because the adjustment mechanism
while imperfect, worked to mitigate the buildup of extemal imbal-
ances. Countries with extemal deficits would experience higher
interest rates, a loss of gold reserves, and lower money and credit
growth. The resulting reduction in wages and prices would con-
tribute to the restoration of trade competitiveness.
This mechanism was not operative in the case of Greece under the
euro. In the eurozone, the market's perception that Greek sovereign
516
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debt represented a safe investment—^probably founded on the
expectation of a bailout by core countries—suppressed the effect of
sovereign credit risk on Greek interest rates. At the same time, low
interest rates greased the wheels of fiscal expansion by sending the
message that there was no price to be paid for the buUdup of sover-
eign debt. Hence, while extemal imbalances were essentially self-
correcting under the gold standard, they were self-perpetuating in
the eurozone due to the perception of an absence of credit risk.
We draw two main conclusions. First, the durability of a monetary
union is cmciaUy dependent on the existence of a weU-fnnctioning
adjustment mechanism. Second, adherence to a hard peg is no
panacea and cannot be sustained without the support of credible fis-
cal institutions.
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